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Summary
• How we are (and have been) 
―Defining the state of the art
§ Foundational research in assurance technology
― Pushing the state of the practice 
§ Application of research to enable application of emerging 
technologies
§ Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) missions
―Developing supporting tools and technologies
§ AdvoCATE (Assurance Case Automation Toolset)
§ Proven application in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) missions
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Research Motivation
• High-hazard industries are moving to active safety management
― Safety management system (SMS) in aviation
―Need to 
§ Unify reasoning about technical aspects of safety
§ Support safety-related decision making
•Goals-based regulation is attractive for novel applications
―When performance standards are absent 
§ Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), Autonomous systems, …
― Increases flexibility for regulated entity
― Evidence-based assurance à safety case 
Foundational research in languages, methodology, and automation 
support
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Practical Motivation
• MIZOPEX (2013)
― NASA Earth science mission with Sierra UAS off Alaska coast
― Flight in combination of US National Airspace + Oceanic Airspace
― Use of air defense radar for detect and avoid
― Project needed FAA approval through submission of safety case – a 
detailed safety justification
• UTM (2016 – Ongoing)
― Fleet of small UAS demonstrating low-altitude traffic management 
system
― Flight in US national airspace, over sparsely populated land
― Use of ground-based radar for detect and avoid
― Project needed FAA approval through submission of safety case
Practical application of our research solutions 
in response to customer needs
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Safety Case
‘A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of 
evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case 
that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating 
environment’ 
- UK MOD, DS-00-56 Issue 4 (2007)
• Essentially, a safety risk management artifact
―Other compatible definitions and guidance on content
§ Based on application domain, standard, regulatory paradigm, etc. 
– FAA: Order 8900.1, FSIMS, vol. 16, UAS
– NAVAIR: Instruction 13034.4
– ICAO and Eurocontrol: Safety case development manual
– Automotive: ISO 26262
– FDA: Infusion pumps total product lifecycle guidance
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Safety Case Content
• FAA (8900.1, FSIMS, vol. 16, UAS)
―Core content
§ Environment (airspace system) description 
§ System description and system change description 
§ Airworthiness description of affected items
§ Aircraft capabilities and flight data
§ Accident / incident data 
§ Pilot / crew roles and responsibilities
§ Hazard analysis and details of risk analysis, risk assessment, and 
risk control
§ Emergency and contingency procedures 
― Safety risk management plan
§ Hazard tracking and treatment
§ Safety performance monitoring
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Safety Case Content
• In general, 
― Explicit statement of safety assurance objectives
―Heterogeneous evidence
§ Datasheets, design and analysis, verification, operational 
testing,…
― Structured argument
§ Capturing rationale why evidence supports the claims made
• Additionally,
― Safety architecture providing a risk basis
―Hazard log and hazard analyses
― Evidence model 
―Monitoring and update
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Assurance Cases
‘A documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid 
argument that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system’s 
properties are adequately justified for a given application in a given 
environment’
- MITRE (2005)
‘A reasoned and compelling argument, supported by a body of evidence, 
that a system, service, or organization, will operate as intended for a 
defined application, in a defined environment’
- Goal Structuring Notation Standard (2011)
‘A structured set of arguments and a body of evidence showing that an 
(information) system satisfies specific claims with respect to a given 
quality attribute’
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (2013)
Generalization of safety cases to other assurance properties: security, 
dependability, …
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Risk Control 
Risk Analysis 
and Assessment
Hazard Effect Severity Likelihood Initial Risk 
Level
Hazard
Control
Residual 
Risk Level
H1 - Airspace 
encounter with 
GA aircraft
NMAC 
/ MAC
2 (Haz.)
1 (Cat.)
Probable
Probable
2B
1B
Detect & Avoid
Flt. 
Termination
... 
2D
2D
H2 – Stall CFIT
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Safety Risk Management Approach
System Analysis
Concept of Operations, 
System/change description, 
Regulations, …
HazID
Hazards 
Operational, functional, …
Design target
Barrier Modeling – Abstract Safety Architecture
Safety 
Requirements 
Implementation
Mitigations
Safety requirements
Barrier and Control functions 
Risk scenarios, design targets, 
risk evaluation 
Assurance Rationale 
(Structured Argument)
G1
Safety of operations
C1
CONOPS
C2
URS
S1
Argument
of hazard
mitigation
G2
All identified hazards
acceptably mitigated 
C3
Characterization
of acceptable
mitigation
C4
OpHA
S2
Argument
over
operation
al phases
S3
Argument
over each
hazard
individually
G4
Mitigation of airspace
encounter with GA
aircraft penetrating
containment boundary 
A
A1
HazID complete and
correct
M1
Mitigation of Flight-
phase hazards
Evidence Artifacts
Design, Analysis, Verification
Testing,  
Assurance claims, 
strategies, context, 
rationale, …
Operational Safety 
Assurance 
(Monitoring and Update)
Safety performance 
measures, monitors, …
Operational Evidence
Verification of safety performance targets
Assumption corroboration
Hazard tracking, Precursors, …
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Risk Control 
Risk Analysis 
and Assessment
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This Talk
System Analysis
Concept of Operations, 
System/change description, 
Regulations, …
HazID
Hazards 
Operational, functional, …
Design target
Barrier Modeling – Abstract Safety Architecture
Safety 
Requirements 
Implementation
Mitigations
Safety requirements
Barrier and Control functions 
Risk scenarios, design targets, 
risk evaluation 
Assurance Rationale 
(Structured Argument)
G1
Safety of operations
C1
CONOPS
C2
URS
S1
Argument
of hazard
mitigation
G2
All identified hazards
acceptably mitigated 
C3
Characterization
of acceptable
mitigation
C4
OpHA
S2
Argument
over
operation
al phases
S3
Argument
over each
hazard
individually
G4
Mitigation of airspace
encounter with GA
aircraft penetrating
containment boundary 
A
A1
HazID complete and
correct
M1
Mitigation of Flight-
phase hazards
Evidence Artifacts
Design, Analysis, Verification
Testing,  
Assurance claims, 
strategies, context, 
rationale, …
Operational Safety 
Assurance 
(Monitoring and Update)
Safety performance 
measures, monitors, …
Operational Evidence
Verification of safety performance targets
Assumption corroboration
Hazard tracking, Precursors, …
• Motivation
• ASSURANCE CASES
• Example
• Tool Support
• Outlook
Barrier Modeling
• Collection of barrier models providing a risk basis
―Collection of all factors affecting risk
―Model for risk qualification/quantification
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Event chain / accident trajectory
Barrier compromise/breach
Loss of 
Control
State
Threats / 
Causes / 
Initiating 
Events or 
States
Accident / 
Loss / 
Harmful 
States or 
Events
Prevention Barriers Recovery Barriers
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Bow Tie Diagram (BTD)
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Example: Loss of Separation
Escalation 
Factor
Threat
Top 
Event
Hazard
Consequence
Barrier & Control
Escalation Factor Barriers 
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Rationale Capture
Chain of 
reasoning
Safety / Dependability Claims
Item of Evidence
Developed 
claims
Documentation and Details
Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN)
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Tiered Assurance Framework
Tier Core Assurance Concerns and Scope Additional  Assurance Qualities 
Safety 
Objectives 
System Safety 
– Safe concept (safety designed-in) 
– Safety in design 
– Safety in implementation 
– Safe transition into service 
– Safety in operations 
– TLOS / Acceptable level of risk 
– Safe disposal 
Due diligence 
Reduction of risk 
– ALARP 
– SFAIRP 
– ASARP 
Compliance 
with Aviation 
Regulations 
Processes; 
– Maturity, … 
Input data; 
People;  
– Competence, … 
Method and Tools;  
– Qualification, … 
Safety management system;  
Lifecycle 
1 
Overall Assurance 
All hazards / hazard risk statements, i.e., combination of 
hazardous situation, hazard release.  
 
All relevant consequences across all BTDs.  
 
All applicable 
regulatory 
requirements 
Coverage; 
Independence of threats; 
Effectiveness;  
…. 
2 
Profile of Risks 
For each hazard, all risk scenarios (consequences), e.g., 
midair collision, near midair collision, ground collision, …  
Coverage (function, environment, 
interactions, scenarios, …);  
Independence;  
... 
Specific consequence, e.g., midair collision  
All causal chains, threats, and dangerous interactions across 
all hazards.  
3 
Individual Risks 
Specific risk scenario, i.e., causal chain of consequence, 
top event, threats, causes/precursors  
Depth;  
Independence; 
Proactiveness: Prevention vs. Recovery; 
… Applicable system of barriers / safety measures  
4 
Barriers 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose  
Delivery of required service 
Depth;  
Independence;  
Common causes/modes, … 
5 
Controls 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose 
Delivery of required service 
Reliability and effectiveness;  
Availability; Functional / safety integrity; 
Resilience; Fail safety; Data integrity;  
Verifiability; … 
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Factors Affecting UAS Safety
Combination of operating modes
• Visual line of sight (VLOS)
• Beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS)
• Beyond radio line of sight (BRLOS)
Varying access profiles
• Operating range
• Terminal airspace
• Transit (vertical / lateral)
Diverse environment
• Populated / urban / built-up areas
• Uncontrolled / controlled airspace
• Low / high density airspace
Varying mission concepts
• Package delivery
• Surveillance
• Aerial inspection
• Mapping, …
Different configurations
• Airborne sensors (Lidar, sonar, 
FPV camera, Radar)
• Ground sensors (Radar)
• Multiple GCS, Roaming GCS, …
Increasing 
complexity in 
mission and 
operations
• Motivation
• Assurance cases
• EXAMPLE
• Tool Support
• Outlook
UAS Safety Assurance
• Scope of UAS safety
― Design assurance 
― Prior to deployment
― Engineering evidence from development of fitness for purpose
• Operational assurance
― Post-deployment, runtime evidence
― Corroboration of expected safety performance
• Safety measures should be commensurate with the risk posed by the 
intended operations
― Level of risk posed dictates safety measures employed and the extent 
of assurance provided
• Preferred form of safety justification (FAA Order 8900.1)
― Safety Case
― Assessment of Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS)
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UTM / UAS Safety
T2 
T3 
T1 
T4 
Notional CONOPS
Identified Hazards
Traceability from Hazards to
Mitigation Barriers
• Surveillance Requirements
• Avoidance maneuvers, 
Procedures, etc.
• Justification and Rationale
R1
R0
R3
R2
CA93
t = 90s
t = 75s
t > 90s
Airspace / Threat Modeling
Risk Control 
Risk Analysis 
and Assessment
Hazard Effect Severity Likelihood Initial Risk 
Level
Hazard
Control
Residual 
Risk Level
H1 - Airspace 
encounter with 
GA aircraft
NMAC 
/ MAC
2 (Haz.)
1 (Cat.)
Probable
Probable
2B
1B
Detect & Avoid
Flt. 
Termination
... 
2D
2D
H2 – Stall CFIT
System Analysis
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Regulations, …
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Design target
Barrier Modeling – Abstract Safety Architecture
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Assumption corroboration
Hazard tracking, Precursors, …
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Risk Assessment
• Residual risk = Consequence probability x severity
― Probability of disjunction of all paths leading to consequence
§ Inclusion exclusion principle
― Path probability = Joint probability of all events on path
§ Barrier integrity, threat event probability
― Assumptions and data
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Recall Tiered Assurance
Tier Core Assurance Concerns and Scope Additional  Assurance Qualities 
Safety 
Objectives 
System Safety 
– Safe concept (safety designed-in) 
– Safety in design 
– Safety in implementation 
– Safe transition into service 
– Safety in operations 
– TLOS / Acceptable level of risk 
– Safe disposal 
Due diligence 
Reduction of risk 
– ALARP 
– SFAIRP 
– ASARP 
Compliance 
with Aviation 
Regulations 
Processes; 
– Maturity, … 
Input data; 
People;  
– Competence, … 
Method and Tools;  
– Qualification, … 
Safety management system;  
Lifecycle 
1 
Overall Assurance 
All hazards / hazard risk statements, i.e., combination of 
hazardous situation, hazard release.  
 
All relevant consequences across all BTDs.  
 
All applicable 
regulatory 
requirements 
Coverage; 
Independence of threats; 
Effectiveness;  
…. 
2 
Profile of Risks 
For each hazard, all risk scenarios (consequences), e.g., 
midair collision, near midair collision, ground collision, …  
Coverage (function, environment, 
interactions, scenarios, …);  
Independence;  
... 
Specific consequence, e.g., midair collision  
All causal chains, threats, and dangerous interactions across 
all hazards.  
3 
Individual Risks 
Specific risk scenario, i.e., causal chain of consequence, 
top event, threats, causes/precursors  
Depth;  
Independence; 
Proactiveness: Prevention vs. Recovery; 
… Applicable system of barriers / safety measures  
4 
Barriers 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose  
Delivery of required service 
Depth;  
Independence;  
Common causes/modes, … 
5 
Controls 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose 
Delivery of required service 
Reliability and effectiveness;  
Availability; Functional / safety integrity; 
Resilience; Fail safety; Data integrity;  
Verifiability; … 
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Argument-based Assurance
Tier Core Assurance Concerns and Scope Additional  Assurance Qualities 
Safety 
Objectives 
System Safety 
– Safe concept (safety designed-in) 
– Safety in design 
– Safety in implementation 
– Safe transition into service 
– Safety in operations 
– TLOS / Acceptable level of risk 
– Safe disposal 
Due diligence 
Reduction of risk 
– ALARP 
– SFAIRP 
– ASARP 
Compliance 
with Aviation 
Regulations 
Processes; 
– Maturity, … 
Input data; 
People;  
– Competence, … 
Method and Tools;  
– Qualification, … 
Safety management system;  
Lifecycle 
1 
Overall Assurance 
All hazards / hazard risk statements, i.e., combination of 
hazardous situation, hazard release.  
 
All relevant consequences across all BTDs.  
 
All applicable 
regulatory 
requirements 
Coverage; 
Independence of threats; 
Effectiveness;  
…. 
2 
Profile of Risks 
For each hazard, all risk scenarios (consequences), e.g., 
midair collision, near midair collision, ground collision, …  
Coverage (function, environment, 
interactions, scenarios, …);  
Independence;  
... 
Specific consequence, e.g., midair collision  
All causal chains, threats, and dangerous interactions across 
all hazards.  
3 
Individual Risks 
Specific risk scenario, i.e., causal chain of consequence, 
top event, threats, causes/precursors  
Depth;  
Independence; 
Proactiveness: Prevention vs. Recovery; 
… Applicable system of barriers / safety measures  
4 
Barriers 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose  
Delivery of required service 
Depth;  
Independence;  
Common causes/modes, … 
5 
Controls 
Functional safety / fitness for purpose 
Delivery of required service 
Reliability and effectiveness;  
Availability; Functional / safety integrity; 
Resilience; Fail safety; Data integrity;  
Verifiability; … 
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Barrier Fitness for Purpose
Ground-based surveillance can 
adequately detect and track 
intruders 
Detection and 
tracking in the 
radar cone of 
silence
Radar detection 
and tracking
ADS-B 
tracking
Range safety display 
provides adequate 
situational picture
Data 
displayed
Range safety 
display functionality
Equipage
UA minimum 
equipment list
Threats visible
VFR / VMC 
Display 
calibration
Pre-flight checks
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• Tool Support
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AdvoCATE
Developing 
Structured 
Arguments
Assurance Case Automation Toolset (AdvoCATE)
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• TOOL SUPPORT
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AdvoCATE
Bow Tie ModelingAutomated View Extraction
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AdvoCATE
• Hazard analysis and safety requirements capture
• Structured arguments
― Pattern specification and automated pattern instantiation
― Integration of formal methods and formal tool-based evidence
― Hierarchical and Modular refactoring
― Argument queries and views
― Argument verification
― Metrics
― Report generation
• Safety architectures 
― Bow tie modeling
― Views
― Transformations (event and barrier split / merge) 
• Evidence management
• Safety, Mission Assurance, and Risk management (SMART) Dashboard
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RISC and OHs
• NASA adoption of safety case paradigm
• Promulgated by Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA)
―Objective hierarchies (OHs) 
§ Decomposition of assurance objectives
– Safety, reliability and maintainability, software assurance, range 
safety, …
―Risk informed safety case (RISC) 
§ System Safety Handbook, vols. 1 & 2
§ Elaborates 
– NASA acquisition process based on safety performance
– Supplier requirements for justification of safety performance
– Argumentation for rationale capture
– Risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis for decision making
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RISC and OHs
• Software assurance research program funding (FY18)
―Retrospective characterization of assurance afforded by RISC and 
Software OH against an assurance baseline
― Assurance baseline from NASA ARC BioSentinel mission
§ CFS/CFE
§ V&V artifacts
§ Current NASA assurance standards and guidelines
―Mapping to RISC and OH to assurance artifacts
§ Analysis of potential gaps and assurance deficits
― Tool support via AdvoCATE
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Conclusions and Future Work
• Development of end-to-end assurance methodology and tool support
• Foundational research, informed by and corroborated in practical 
application
• Safety cases created were the first of their kind
―MIZOPEX: First civil safety case to be approved
§ NASA Honor Award 
―UTM Safety Case: First civil safety case to be approved for using 
ground-based detect and avoid to conduct BVLOS operations in 
the NAS
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Conclusions and Future Work
• Ongoing focus on design-time assurance
― Artifacts and rationale from development, prior to release-into-service
• Outlook towards operational assurance through lifecycle
― In-service safety performance monitoring
• Dashboard for stakeholder-specific assurance
• Current focus on safety
― Expansion in focus to mission assurance 
― Expansion in application domain to spaceflight
§ Initially robotic
§ Eventually, human spaceflight
Looking for opportunities to infuse our technology 
into other SGT customer projects
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Abstract
The Assurance Case approach is being adopted 
in a number of safety-/mission-critical application 
domains in the U.S., e.g., medical devices, 
defense aviation, automotive systems, and, 
lately, civil aviation. This paradigm refocuses 
traditional, process-based approaches to 
assurance on demonstrating explicitly stated 
assurance goals, emphasizing the use 
of structured rationale, and concrete product-
based evidence as the means for providing 
justified confidence that systems and software 
are fit for purpose in safely achieving mission 
objectives. NASA has also been embracing 
assurance cases through the concepts of Risk 
Informed Safety Cases (RISCs), as documented 
in the NASA System Safety Handbook, and 
Objective Hierarchies (OHs), as put forth by the 
Agency's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
(OSMA). This talk will give an overview of the 
work being performed by the SGT team located 
at NASA Ames Research Center, in developing 
technologies and tools to engineer and apply 
assurance cases in customer projects pertaining 
to aviation safety. We elaborate how 
our Assurance Case Automation Toolset 
(AdvoCATE) has not only extended the state-of-
the-art in assurance case research, but also 
demonstrated its practical utility. We have 
successfully developed safety assurance cases 
for a number of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
(UAS) operations, which underwent, and passed, 
scrutiny both by the aviation regulator, i.e., the 
FAA, as well as the applicable NASA boards for 
airworthiness and flight safety, flight readiness, 
and mission readiness. We discuss our efforts in 
expanding AdvoCATE capabilities to support 
RISCs and OHs under a project recently funded 
by OSMA under its Software Assurance 
Research Program. Finally, we speculate on the 
applicability of our innovations beyond aviation 
safety to such endeavors as robotic, and human 
spaceflight.
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